

**ELECTORAL ISLAMISM:
THE POLITICAL CLEAVAGE AND VOTER ALIGNMENT OF PROSPEROUS
JUSTICE PARTY (PKS) IN INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS**

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Abstract

This study delves an outcome of electoral Islamism in Indonesia. The question posed in this research want to answer why PKS only becomes a middle party in Indonesia. By using the historical comparative analysis approach, the study argues that the different degrees of political cleavages and voter alignments in Indonesia is more plausible in explaining the progress of the electoral results of that Islamist party. This article wants to argue that in Indonesia Islamic activism was not really banned by the authoritarian regime, at least, culturally. Thus, they still had a chance to develop, cultivating plurality of political cleavages in the democratic system. In actual, the political fragmentations of Islamic parties based on Islamic ideological spectrums are more plural. In turn, it emerges such situation where the effort of the Islamist party like PKS in getting support of Muslim voters will face more competitors from other Islamic parties.

Keywords: *Electoral Islamism, Islamist Party, Political Cleavages, Voter Alignments, & PKS.*

The Strategies of PKS in Facing Democratic Elections (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014)

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) is one of the parties that is currently passing the trials of the reformation. In the 1999 election, when it was named Partai Keadilan (PK), the party managed to gain 1,436,565 votes or about 1.36% of the total votes. The result has placed 7 representatives of PK in the Assembly (DPR). Because of that result, the position of PK ranked on seventh of the total electoral outcomes —there were 96 parties, although finally only 48 parties that became contestants— or in the fourth rank, calculated by the votes of new parties.¹ In the 2004 election, PKS votes rose significantly by winning 8.325.020 votes or 7.34% of the total votes.² The outcome has brought PKS to the sixth position of the 24 parties participating in the election. The electoral outcomes also have also been filed by PKS to place its 45 representatives in DPR. Not only in the national contestation, PKS was also successful at the provincial level. PKS managed to obtain the total number of votes from each province of 8,290,425. PKS has successfully placed 158 representatives spread across provinces in Indonesia. Another political winning was the election of Hidayat Nur Wahid, one of the key

¹ "Pemilu 1999" in <http://kpu.go.id/index.php/pages/detail/2008/11/Pemilu-1999>

² KPU, *Pemilihan Umum 2004 Dalam Angka dan Gambar Peristiwa*, p. 137.

PKS figures, as Head of the MPR. Of the four post-reformation elections (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014), the 2004 election was the most significant PKS success compared to the previous elections. The 2009 and 2014 elections were relatively stagnant, although it can still be interpreted as having a little extra vote in 2014.

The 2004 election results continued consistently in the 2009 elections, even its electoral outcomes brought PKS in the top four. The result brought PKS as an Islamic party that gets the most votes. PKS seats in DPR also increased to 57 or increased 12 from the previous period seats. In the 2014 election, although only able to get a ranking of six and 40 seats in the DPR, PKS still managed to get a vote above 5%, ie 6.79%.³ PKS also succeeded in placing one of its cadres as head of the DPR—even though ultimately fired. Beyond that, the PKS has also consistently placed its cadres on local legislative seats and regional leaders.

The success PKS that persists for more than a decade—and still continuing—is an interesting trend highlighted. Unlike other major parties, the success of PKS is the lack of reliance on well-known figures. Compared to its figures, PKS is more popular as a da'wah party.⁴ In many ways, PKS is also called some circles as an unusual party.⁵ As a political contestant, every election event becomes a "test of guts" of PKS. The political strategy became the main key to this party survives in every political event. All form of strategy undertaken by PKS is a political expression of PKS. From the various forms of strategy, PKS pragmatism and idealism will be categorized by itself.

In the 1999 election—when it was named PK—the party did not put forward a campaign to gain outcomes. They rely on a network of cadres that are claimed to have existed in 21 provinces and 200 branches level II with the number of active cadres to 200 thousand people.⁶ The majority of PK cadres and sympathizers are among the middle-aged youth and students. It is a causality of the root of party formation initiated by campus missionary activists, including the networks that had been nurtured in rohis. The pattern then became distinctive until nowadays, therefore, PK or later changed to PKS can also be called as party cadre.

The cadre network has been utilized by this dakwah party from the election to the election. In the 1999 election, they targeted 10 percent of the vote, assuming every cadre could invite 10-20 people.⁷ To be more attached, one of the ways in which PK is held various tryout college entrance examination which majority are in the urban area. PK also closes ranks with young cadres who are studying abroad. The power of the mass is not obtained by PK in a short time. Reformation is only a way for strengthening the base that has been done for a long time. Before becoming a political movement, since the 1980s, the backbone of PK has been closely aligned with the activities of dakwah campus. The genealogy that makes PK label in the community is an urban party, young man,

³ Dani Prabowo, "Disahkan KPU, Ini Perolehan Suara Pemilu Legislatif 2014 in <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/05/09/2357075/Disahkan.KPU.Ini.Perolehan.Suar.a.Pemilu.Legislatif.2014>, 9th of May 2014.

⁴ Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 278.

⁵ Burhanudin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS Suara dan Syariah*, (Jakarta: KPG, 2012), hp 5.

⁶ Damanik, *Fenomena Partai*, p. 265.

⁷ *Ibid.*

and educated people party. The base that has been arranged neatly makes PK has a solid mass.

To attract mass outside the solid base, the strategy used by PK that used its image as the successor of Masyumi. However, that way was actually not effective enough, because, in addition to PK, some parties also imaged themselves as the successor of the Masyumi, such as PKB, PKU, and parties that label themselves with the name Masyumi. That was what makes the vote of PK, although it can enter the top 10, but still dominant solid mass ballots. The solid mass was in addition to being PK power in the early days of reformation, also a weakness; the mass who want to be part of the party difficult to join the PK. Because there is no denying that there is a typical psychological gap between PK members and outsiders.⁸ However, with its solid mass, PK is able to measure its ability. To capture the vast masses, at that time, PK also formed an online portal that has not been done many other parties.

Thus, in the 1999 election, PK was only able to attract solid cadres or sympathizers. That solidity also made a boomerang for PK. In the wider community, society viewed PK as an exclusive party. Later, the issue of exclusivity became PK evaluation of the 1999 election. Some even argue that the 1999 election was a PK failure.⁹ Concretely, the failure was clearly illustrated in the inability of PK to pass electoral threshold of 2% as stipulated in the 1999 Election Law, chapter VII, article 3, PK threatened by not being able to contest the next election.

The political steps taken by the PKS top brass to be able to participate in the 2004 elections is to lobby lawmakers through their parliamentary cadres, to fight through the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi), and to prepare for the establishment of new political parties. The first step does not work, the second step is not continued, the third step was realistic and continued to be matured to the end. The context, if the party wants to contest the 2004 election contest and cannot pass electoral threshold, the party must join the other party or establish a new party. The third step chosen was consistent by PK. The move also resulted in the establishment of PKS on 20 April 2002. When PKS was established, PK merged with PKS. In a superstructure and infrastructure, the PKS actually is no different with PK. It was just that with the addition of the name "Kesejahteraan", the party widen the field of struggle. Not only to fight for justice of law change through political channels but also to help society down to solve all its welfare problems.

In the 2004 elections, in addition to strengthening the solid mass network, PKS was also massive in campaigning on universal issues, such as clean government. Even PKS issued anecdotes, PKS is an abbreviation of "Pantang Korupsi dan Sogokan".¹⁰ In this case, PKS performed image and strategy refreshment. Therefore, it is not excessive to change PK into PKS called a transition process. To introduce themselves to the broader community, PKS only has 10 months, from mid-2003 to election 2004 event. Various brands of PKS was massively distributed to the community through pins, stickers, hats, and other attributes. It was a fairness when the transition process is understood by

⁸ Aay Muhamad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer*, (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004), p. 162.

⁹ Burhanudin Harahap, *Dilema PKS*, p. 7.

¹⁰ Almuzammil Yusuf, *Isu Besar Dak wah dalam Pemilu besar*, p. 33.

PKS cadres, so the refreshment of opinion in the community is intense and becomes the focus.

"The days are the winning of the General Election (*hari-hari adalah kemenangan politik*)" is the slogan of PKS voiced to its cadres in the 2004 elections. To get a lot of votes, PKS cadres were given an appeal to at least nibble 1-2 people.¹¹ Although the target cannot be proven successful or not concretely, it was PKS principle. Almuzzammil Yusuf, one of PKS figures, randomly counts the rough target of PKS cadres;

*"If the target of 13.5 million minus the electorate then 1.4 million, then there are 12.1 million, or even 12 million. So the new target of 12 million, if we divide by 300 thousand cadres (beginner and core), then per cadre get the burden of 40 voter recruitment. If the recruitment fee of 12 million to the core cadres amounted to 30 thousand people, then per core cadre get the burden of 40 voters. That recruitment costs if we divide into 40 weeks to from July to April 2004, then the average per week, per cadre must be 1 person; while per core cadre must be 10 people."*¹²

Almuzzammil's explanation tells us that PKS was making use of its network to acquire new cadres or voters. Kinship and friendship are the top choices. For PKS, that method is a low-cost networking. As the substance of the recruitment, PKS put forward its image that has not been "tarnished". Since 1999, PK / PKS has consistently established its image and track record as a party free of bribes.¹³ In West Java, the name of PKS has a positive image, because, in addition to a fairly massive networking, 2 PKS cadres in the Provincial DPRD once returned the bribe money. In South Sumatra, when almost all members of the Provincial DPRD receive bribes, PKS cadres do not accept them, similarly in Jambi and Aceh. Even in Jambi, party cadres rejected bribes despite getting gun threats. The local newspaper in Aceh, in a fairly subjective tone, quoted a mother's dialogue to her daughter, *"when looking for a mate, look for Nasir Jamil (PKS cadre)."*¹⁴

Although it was quite intensive to raise the issue of clean governance, the Islamic factor remains strongly attached to the image of the PKS, caused its cadres attached themselves with Islamic symbols, such as hijab, long dress, skullcap, even beard identified by the cadre as the Sunna of the prophet. Therefore, PKS exclusivity image remains strong in society. The image is the strength of PKS, and then also an evaluation to face the 2009 elections.

In the 2009 elections, in addition to striving for universal issues, PKS was more courageous to present an inclusive image. It can be traced from "Mukernas PKS" in Bali in 2008. In Mukernas, there was a cross-over of opinion about the declaration of PKS as an open party.¹⁵ The slogan *"PKS: Partai Kita Semua"* was also voiced, besides *"Bersih, Peduli, dan Profesional"*. The slogan was followed by the appearance of punk children's ads and women without veiling.¹⁶ In the ad welcoming the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge) 2008, PKS also features figures

¹¹ Yusuf, *Isu Besar*, p. 41.

¹² Yusuf, *Isu Besar*, p. 58.

¹³ Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS*, p. 176.

¹⁴ Yusuf, *Isu Besar*, p. 60-61.

¹⁵ "Yusuf Supendi dan Simpul Perpecahan PKS" in <https://news.detik.com/berita/1595480/yusuf-supendi-dan-simpul-perpecahan-pks>, 18th of March 2011

¹⁶ Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS*, p. 235.

from various backgrounds, NU, Muhammadiyah, and Nationalist. Exploitation of segments outside the solid base created two things that are quite a dilemma for the PKS. On the one hand, there was a 'division' on the solid basis of the PKS, as some cadres feel the party has moved away from khittah. However, on the one hand, PKS can encompass a wider base or area. Therefore, although there was a historical trial on the internal of PKS, so there were pros and cons that could lead to a split, PKS votes in the 2009 elections increased. Although PKS vote raised not significant, however, when viewed from the votes of parties in the 2009 election, the PKS is the Islamic-based party that gets the highest votes.

Escaped from the 2009 election, PKS managed to sustain the 2014 election. In the face of the 2014 election, there were four strategic agendas buzzed by PKS. First, inaugurated the structure of the Central Executive Board as a platform for integration between party structure and fraction structure in the council. Second, establishing the Superior Council of PKS, Third, opened opportunities for non-Muslim membership. Fourth, raising the number of cadres.¹⁷ Of the four strategic agendas, the third and fourth agenda which is the PKS tactical step in getting votes. PKS's openness was a 'refresher' for the exclusivity issue that has become its longlasting character. However, in order not to lose its solid base, PKS was more vocal in responding to transnational Islamic issues, such as the liberation of Palestine.¹⁸

For the recruitment of the masses through regeneration, the PKS network was more established than the previous elections. From year to year, the solid base of PKS is always enlarged. The enlargement of the base is the result of family development and kinship of PKS cadres. If a large family of PKS cadres, for example, has a total of three married couples, then each couple has at least two children, which means the total is six. That means the increase in the number of cadres in a large family is already six because PKS cadre parent usually lowers the values held by the party. They also usually share the same understanding of their ideology.¹⁹ This is cause that makes party values strongly inherent. Therefore, ideologically-psychologically, the substance of party values is embedded in the PKS cadres. This method also became a typical tradition in the recruitment of PKS cadres.

The Obstacles of PKS in Facing Elections Internally

Although until the 2014 election, PKS was able to pass the trials of reformation, from its inception, PKS was not able to get into the top three. In addition to the 2004 elections, PKS votes even stagnate. It describes a party dynamics that is not static. Some issues arise internally, which ultimately forms party dynamics, including cadre debates on the party's direction, which leads to an internal conflict, fund-raising, and negative cases, such as corruption by party cadres.

¹⁷ <http://www.suaramedia.com/berita-nasional/23812-rebranding-revolusi-pks-buka-jalur-keanggotaan-bagi-nonmuslim.html>

¹⁸ See, "Perjuangan Palestina Dimenangkan Allah melalui Islam dan al-Qur'an", <http://temanggung.pks.id/2013/03/perjuangan-palestina-dimenangkan-allah.html>, "Google Akui Palestina, Israel Meradang", <http://sumut.pks.id/2013/05/google-akui-palestina-israel-meradang.html>, 5th May 2013.

¹⁹ Firman Noor, *Perpecahan dan Soliditas Partai Islam di Indonesia: Kasus PKB dan PKS di Dekade Awal Reformasi*, (Jakarta: LIPI, 2015), p. 347.

Since its inception, the potential for conflict in PKS internally has actually emerged. During the formation of the party in 1998, there were pros and cons among da'wah activists. Some say it was necessary to establish a political party, others say it was not necessary. Those who feel unnecessary want an organization that they have long formed into NGOs, pesantren campuses, and other social institutions.²⁰ However, the debate can be measured, to what extent the parties agree and not with the wish of party formation. It can be reviewed from surveys distributed to 6,000 components of da'wah activists. As many as 86% agreed with the formation of the party, while the rest agreed with the formation of the organization toward social institutions other than the party. That was, there were 800-1000 who don't agree with the will of the establishment of PK. PK births are preceded by their internal pros and cons.²¹

But in the face of the 1999 elections, the pros and cons weren't a problem. Even in the years that followed, the variations of that view became its own power. Many PK / PKS cadres established various social institutions, such as Nurul Fikri (tutoring guidance), *Tarbiwi, Ummi, Annida, Saksi, Sabili* (magazine), Gema Insani Press, Al-Ishlahy Press, Pustaka Al-Kautsar, Robbani Press, Era Intermedia, Asy-Syamil (publisher), Khoiru Ummah (da'wah institution), Al-Hikmah (Islamic educational institution), Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat (PKPU), Institute of Student and Youth for Democracy (INSYD) Economics Studies (INFES), Center for Indonesian Reform (CIR), Domet Sosial Ummul Qurro (philanthropic institution), and others.

Differences of opinion leading to the new conflict occurred after the 2004 elections, precisely at Mukernas 2008 in Bali. Mukernas was prepared for the stabilization of preparations for the 2009 election. In Mukernas, there was an openness issue that made the pros and cons hard. Even the selection of Bali as the host of Mukernas also becomes a complicated issue. Some internal circles questioned and criticized the election of the place. Eramuslim site even raised in the rubric of oaseiman with the title "Antara Bali dan Gaza." The title intended to criticize the election of PKS Mukernas.²²

Poros and contras opinion about the selection of places were also related to the issue of openness carried on Mukernas 2008. On Mukernas, PKS affirmed to open up. The issue of plurality produced in Mukernas Bali was busy discussed by the media.²³ Hilmi Aminuddin in his speech firmly highlighted the issue of pluralism. According to him, PKS recognized and valued plurality. "*This is not a strategy, but it is our belief in understanding the teachings of Islam,*" said Hilmi who was applauded by participants Mukernas.²⁴ Mustafa Kamal, Head of Public Policy Division of DPP PKS, also asserted,

²⁰ Damanik, *Fenomena Partai*, p. 230.

²¹ M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Ideologi Politik PKS dari Masjid Kampus ke Gerbang Parlemen*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008), p. 34.

²² "Kontroversi Seputar Mukernas PKS di Bali" in <https://muhsinlabib.com/kontroversi-seputar-mukernas-bali-pks>

²³ "Mukernas Bali Penegasan Diri PKS Membuka Diri", in <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/02/01/19064654/Mukernas.Bali.Penegasan.PKS.Membuka.Diri>, 1st of January 2008.

²⁴ "Tak Ada Gema Takbir di Pembukaan Mukernas", in <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-887995/tak-ada-gema-takbir-di-pembukaan-mukernas-pks>, 2nd of February 2008.

"Our mission of transformation is emphasized. We want to abandon the debate of Islam and nationalism, so we go on the substantive issue. Pancasila as a national consensus does not need to be debated."²⁵ Anis Matta's statement more convincing, the direction of the party will move to the middle. It was implied that the PKS wants to leave an exclusive right-party image.

Although the top party assured it, 'disunity' cannot be spared. A former member of the Party Advisory Council, Mashadi stated, resistance to the proposed acceptance of non-Muslim cadres was very strong on Mukernas.²⁶ From 2008 to the last election (2014), issues of openness and the like always arise, as in Mukernas 2010 at Ritz Charlton Hotel Jakarta which was considered part cadres or sympathizers of the party eliminate Marwah party simplicity. A number of PKS cadres or sympathizers deplore the election of the venue by reason of the group's headquarters in Maryland and the owner is Jewish. Islamic sites such as Eramuslim and VOA-Islam strongly criticized PKS policy as an open party, such as making a point that looks like a critical attitude and tone, "PKS: Keterbukaan yang Gagal Total " or "PKS Terkena Sindrom Kekecilan Baju".

Since its inception in 2008, the issue of the catch all streams has become an internal party challenge in the face of elections. Because that issue became an intensive debate internally. At the level of normative ideas, most accept the given argument, but practically, the members of the party were not yet in the same lane. Despite being an intense debate internally, the considerable obstacles to unsteady electoral voters are the cases that wrap around party members. In 2008, a member of PKS council, Beni Bambang Erawan has convicted a suspect in an Rp 87 billion government social assistance (bansos) case. In the pact, he was involved in the procurement of medical equipment for two hospitals worth 800 million rupiahs. Beni was known to receive money worth 125 million rupiahs from one of his colleagues. Special Case Criminal (Pidsus) State Prosecutor's Office Depok set him as the main perpetrator in the case.²⁷

The negative image of the PKS was also quite tarnished, Misbakhun corruption case. He was convicted as a suspect in the case of alleged fictitious L / C Bank Century in 2010. At that time, Misbakhun was a member of Commission XI of DPR from PKS Faction. PKS replaced Misbakhun with Muhammad Firdaus. However, MA set him free from the verdict. So, he also asked PKS to rehabilitate his name, but not realized, and in 2013 he moved to Golkar.²⁸ In 2011, Usep Ukaryana, a PKS cadre, was also involved in a corruption case. He was convicted as a suspect over Program Usaha Agrobisnis Pertanian (PUAP) with a

²⁵ "PKS Terjangkit Sindrom Kekecilan Baju", in <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/suaraislam/2010/06/28/7522/pks-terjangkit-sindrom-kekecilan-baju/#sthash.bijedbx8.dpbs>, 28th of June 2010.

²⁶ Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS*, p. 228

²⁷ "Eks Anggota Dewan Asal PKS Jadi Tersangka Korupsi" in <https://news.okezone.com/read/2010/11/22/340/395814/eks-anggota-dewan-asal-pks-jadi-tersangka-korupsi>, 22nd of November 2010.

²⁸ "Ini Alasan Misbakhun Hijrah ke Golkar" in <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/03/08/14481811/Ini.Alasan.Misbakhun.Hijrah.ke.Golkar>, 8th of March 2013.

sentence of 1 year and 8 months in prison and a fine of 50 million rupiahs.²⁹ One PKS cadre, Tamsil Linrung, also became a subscription to KPK calls, as in the case of bribery in the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, bribery of import quotas of beef in the Ministry of Agriculture and bribery acceleration of regional infrastructure development, alleged corruption cases of Integrated Radio Communication System (SKRT) at the Ministry of Forestry, and cases of corruption of electronic ID card.

In addition to these cases, in 2011, the image of PKS as an Islamic party is severely tarnished by the Arifianto case. When the parliament session took place, he was found watching porn. One of the reporters sitting on the balcony recorded the incident. The case was responded quickly by the PKS, because it involved the image of the party as an Islamic party. Based on the results of the Central Shari'ah Council, K.H. Surahman Hidayat as the Chairman of DSP PKS issued three points that were imposed on Arifianto, among others convincing the concerned to voluntarily resign as a member of Parliament, through taubat nasuha (read istighfar at least 100 times for 40 days, reading the Koran at least one time in 30 days, giving charity to 60 poor people, asking tausiyah to the Chairman of Central Shari'ah Council as Mufti PKS, apologize to all cadres, sympathizers, constituents, and members of parliament and society), dismissed from member of shura of PKS 2010-2015.³⁰

The worst case experienced by PKS is bribery of cow imports conducted by PKS President, Lutfi Ahsan Ishaq. This case has had a meaningful impact on the image of the PKS and was to influence the party's vote in the 2014 election. The survey results of a number of institutions put PKS in the middle of the board even under the standings. LSIN survey released December 1, 2013, put PKS in the fifth position under PDI Perjuangan, Golkar, Demokrat, and Gerindra. While the CSIS survey placed the level of PKS election in position 8 of 10 parties surveyed. The image was in the public spotlight so that every election in the regions was also affected. However, PKS claimed that case has no effect on the electability of PKS candidates who want to advance to become leaders. Ahmad Herawan's victory in West Java at that time was made PKS as the reason for that. One example of PKS denied if the case of PKS President has no effect on electability candidates can also be found in Bogor, PKS carried Ahmad Ru'yat as a candidate for Mayor of Bogor City compete with Bima Arya and Dody Rosadi. One way to stem the negative image of PKS is by not highlighting the party attribute.³¹ However, in reality, PKS was only able to reap the sound in the seventh position. It shows that the case of bribery of cattle import of PKS President quite influential on the electability of PKS in the election. Annis Mata,

²⁹ "Anggota DPRD Subang Tersandung Kasus Korupsi PUAP" in <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/jawa-barat-nasional/13/03/12/mjgg1i-anggota-dprd-subang-tersandung-kasus-korupsi-puap>, 12th of March 2013.

³⁰ "Arifinto Dipecat dari Anggota Dewan Syura PKS" in <https://news.detik.com/berita/1613758/arifinto-dipecat-dari-anggota-dewan-syura-pks>, 11th of April 2011.

³¹ "Achmad Ru'yat Tegaskan Tak Terganggu Kasus Hukum Elite PKS" in <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/jabodetabek-nasional/13/09/11/msycp0-achmad-ruyat-tegaskan-tak-terganggu-kasus-hukum-elite-pks>, 11th of September 2013.

President of PKS further admits, "public opinion has been formed that there is a mistake made by the concerned (Lutfi Hasan-suspect bribery of beef imports)."³²

The Obstacles of PKS in Facing Elections Externally

In addition to the obstacles that came internally, the obstacles also came externally. The real external obstacles affected the image of PKS and affected the internal reactions is the black campaign. Since its inception, PKS has become the object of the black campaign or what they usually call slander (*fitnah*). The first major slander committed to PKS was the issue of terrorism at Haramain Foundation formed by Hidayat Nur Wahid as a top official party in the early 2000s. The issue was debatable because it was brought to the UN court, although the alleged terrorism accusations to the Haramain Foundation declared wrong.

Hidayat Nur Wahid acknowledged that the issue affected the image of PKS in the 2004 elections. He said plainly, "if it had been sent far before the election, PKS ballots can be multiplied." In some areas, the issue thrown into PKS is indeed quite a tool for the competitors. In West Kalimantan, PKS claimed that the majority sympathetic community initially turned to fear. On the northern coast of Java, PKS votes drooped, for example in Indramayu, PKS did not get any seats at the Level I and II DPRD. PKS was also trying to analyze this phenomenon, the problem that they recognize is a shift in the voice of rational voters who stay away from PKS due to the issue. Meanwhile, in the traditional circles, the voters who initially have sympathy to PKS, because assume terrorism is not part of Sunna Wal pilgrims, then PKS shunned. According to Hidayat Nur Wahid, the slander of terrorism was "scary".³³

A big issue that hit PKS cadres was Soeripto's bribery. President of PKS, Tifatul admitted the issue was politically charged. However, unlike the slander of the Haramain Foundation, the size of the issue against its influence on elections is not seen. However, the issue was not revealed, because the prosecutor and the police refused up to six times because there was not enough evidence as a case. Therefore, PKS claimed thay issue as a slander.

Ahead of the 2009 election, PKS also claimed to have been attacked by a libel related to the arrest of Zulhamli Al Hamidi, a member of the Jambi city parliament from PKS at a massage parlor. The security forces arrested Zulhamli for alleged indecent acts, but ultimately not proven. However, oblique information spread quickly, and PKS as a political container for Zulhamli was affected. Even in one private media, the issue of adultery PKS cadres were preached. PKS also conducted an investigation through the Sharia Council, and Zulhamli's results were not proven to be adultery but were still punished for resigning from the party for entering a place full of potential disobedience. However, the outcome of the investigation, PKS claimed that information is slanderous.

Related to the influence of slander against the 2009 Election, PKS, through the then party's President, Tifatul Sembiring, claimed the issue had no effect on the vote of the PKS. Tifatul said the case against Zulhamli did not

³² "Kasus Suap Impor Sapi yang Bikin PKS Merana" in <https://news.detik.com/internasional/2435875/kasus-suap-impor-sapi-yang-bikin-pks-merana>, 9th of December 2013.

³³ "PBB Hapus Yayasan Haramain dari Daftar Terorisme" pada <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/42356/pbb-hapus-yayasan-haramain-dari-daftar-terorisme>, Jumat, 7th of May 2004.

dampen public support for PKS. Because, as he admitted, people already know PKS.³⁴ It was later proved in the election event in 2009, PKS able to gain votes 8.206.955 and 45 seats, so it is in the fourth position or the first position when compared to other Islamic parties.

In the same year, PKS also got an attack stating in a brochure distributed in Kediri as an anti-tahlil party. Defamation was leveled by Muhammad Zaini, ustadz from Datengan Village, Grogol, Kediri. Based on PKS searches, he has spread the black information to about 40 pilgrims who have held religious events at a resident's house in Ploso Kuning Hamlet, Kediri. In the brochure, it contained the words "PKS penganut antitahlil, anti-Maulid Nabi, dan paham yang menganut Wahabi." Deputy Secretary-General DPP PKS at that time, Fahri Hamzah not too serious to respond to it, because he thought it was common. He also claimed that issue does not affect public confidence in the PKS.

In 2014, PKS is also not escaped under the negative campaign. In Makassar, police arrested two young men who distributed negative campaign leaflets. On the sheet contained PKS cadre image arrested by KPK. At that time, the police received reports that there was a dispute in the District Tamalate. In the middle of the dispute, police found two youths handing out the sheet. After being examined, the youths were paid by a person of 25 thousand per person to spread the negative campaign to the community. Responding to the incident, according to PKS, the Indonesian people were smart, already know which party is the most corrupt.

A year before the case in Makassar, PKS in West Java was also attacked by a negative campaign during the governor election. At that time, PKS brought Ahmad Heryawan-Deddy Mizwar as the candidates. In the political event, there are two attacks to the couple. First, the attack of the Molotov cocktail to the house on one of the couple's successful teams in Indramayu. Second, a special negative campaign attack to Ahmad Heryawan through a sheet that claimed he has more than one wife and a masterful corruptor. On the leaflet written, *"Will we be led by the Governor who has more than one wife? And will we be led by the Governor who fosters corruption in West Java and befriends the suspects of bribery?"* PKS claimed the spread of the pamphlet was well organized, because according to PKS search, the pamphlet was encountered in the PKS enclave area, such as Depok, Cipayung, and Cimanggis. To clarify the information, Ahmad Heryawan's wife, Netty Prasetyani gave the clarification to the public. She declared that the information was not true and merely to impose the electability of her husband. The campaign proved unsuccessful, as Ahmad Heryawan-Deddy Mizwar was elected Governor and Deputy Governor of West Java for the second time in a row, beating four other candidates.

The black campaign was up to the political election of Jakarta Governor on 2017-2022 period still thrown by PKS political opponents. PKS carried Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno. At that time, the information maze was increasingly rampant in the community, because the massive Indonesian people use social media as an information channel. A banner that seemed to contain support to Anies was also used as a political opponent as a means of conveying a negative campaign. In the event, the issue of SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antargolongan) was felt, especially after one candidate, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama

³⁴ "Tifatul Sembiring: Zulhamli Tidak Berzinah" in <http://regional.kompas.com/read/2009/02/07/12310911/tifatul.sembiring.zulhamli.tidak.berzinah>, 7th of February 2009.

reportedly offended one verse of the Qur'an. The majority of Muslim societies felt offended, so religious issues stick out. The issue was to affect the electability of the candidates.³⁵

Sensitivity to each candidate was to up. Anies was attacked with the issue of himself as a Shiite. In the opinion of the many lay people, Shiism is considered a heresy that is not Islam. As a staging party, PKS, and also Anies, accused the information was not true. In a more subtle form, PKS found banners scattered in cyberspace, which seem to support Anies-Sandi. In the banner, the left-hand picture of Anies-Sandi has a quote 'We'll Stop Reclamation', and to the right of the photo includes "I'm a True Muslim, No Shia, No Secular". Despite voicing support, PKS considered it a slander, because, the winning team never once entered the content "I'm a True Muslim". The winning team said, "we never made banners with messages divisive or boasted of themselves as True Muslims. The reported banner was a vicious black campaign."

Historically, the black campaign against PKS more than mentioned. However, generally, black campaigns addressed to PKS were attacking with issues that tarnished the party's image as an Islamic party, such as adultery, polygamy, ethics of honesty (corruption), Wahabi, anti-tahlil, shia, and so on. Therefore, the image of PKS that is very strong with Islam, on the one hand, can strengthen the mass base because it already has a clear social container, but on the one hand, it can also be a trap, especially if one of PKS cadres proven to make mistakes. It greatly affects party electability. Unlike parties far from religious imagery, although they are in high corruption rankings compared to PKS, their image is not too tarnished when there are cadres who violate the law. The effect of PKS cadre law violations on electability is strongly evident in the 2014 election.

In addition to the black campaign, PKS's external challenges in the face of elections also came from former PKS cadres. As an outsider, some former PKS cadres, either fired or resigned, reveal internal conditions as they are. Some of them even blame the PKS, causing party leaders to regard the allegations as a slander. That is, that opinion can lead to the destruction of party image. One of the most controversial former PKS cadres is Yusuf Suspendi. In 2011, he reported the President of PKS, who at that time sat in Commission I of DPR to the House of Honor Board for violating the code of ethics. He also complained to the party several times, he once exposed to the public if he was accused by the PKS to interfere with the wife of a person to divorce, he also accused Anis Matta embezzle election funds DKI Jakarta amounting to 10 billion rupiahs originating from the candidate, Adang Daradjatun. PKS claimed that Yusuf's allegations were unfounded, even regard them as slander.³⁶

Yusuf, who moved to Hanura, along with Yudi Chrisnandi Chairman of Hanura, invited other former PKS cadres to be the cadres of Hanura. *"The one who came out, the resigned, the vomiting (back off without information) I'll take to Hanura and at least he chooses Hanura."*³⁷ Implicitly, the words 'at least he chose

³⁵ "Rilis SMRC: Elektabilitas Ahok Naik, Anies Cenderung Turun" in <https://tirto.id/rilis-smrc-elektabilitas-ahok-naik-anies-cenderung-turun-cmzU>, 12th of April 2017

³⁶ "PKS: Tuduhan Yusuf itu Fitnah" in <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/politik/11/03/17/170278-pks-tuduhan-yusuf-itu-fitnah>, 17th of March 2011.

³⁷ "Gabung ke Hanura, Yusuf akan Rekrut Orang Sakit Hati dari PKS" in <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/gabung-ke-hanura-yusuf-akan-rekrut-orang-sakit-hati-dari-pks.html>, 15th of March 2013.

Hanura', as a former PKS cadre, he urged people not to vote for PKS. The active cadres of PKS considered all the opinions that Yusuf expressed as the voice of PKS's 'hurt' cadre.

In addition to Yusuf, the former PKS cadres also openly provide PKS conditions as they are on their respective blogs. Arbania Fitriani, a former PKS cadre, conveyed his writing on PKS on the internet related PKS madrasah on campus and the main mission of PKS which she admits has not been publicly known. Before detailing the reason for her exit from the PKS, she exposed the system of PKS cadres on campus. Starting from the assemblies of syuro'ah (MS), large assemblies (MB), senate (BEM), BPM (MPM), and Islamic spiritual institutions (rohis). There were three reasons why she came out of PKS, the exclusivity between ADK (Campus Dakwah Activist) -which he acknowledged as PKS recruitment venue on campus-with non-ADK. According to her, PKS considered 'liqo' required for ADK to be considered more important than the family, and the main agenda of PKS she interpreted is to destroy Indonesian culture with Arab cultural invention. Although Fitriani's writings cannot be measured in the election, the writings were shared by many people on the internet and led to the lingering assumption from the public that the PKS would destroy the Republic of Indonesia. However, the PKS does not react seriously to that writing, such as making a counterpoint. It shows the seriousness of this issue.

The Comparison of Electoral Outcomes in Last Three Elections (Among Islamist Parties And All Participant)

In the legislative elections in 2004, the total number of parties participating in the elections was 24. Of the 24 parties, 7 of them are parties that were as Islamic parties; PKS, PPP, Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia, PKB, Partai Bintang Reformasi, PAN and PBB. Although some of the 7 parties basically tended to the middle stream, such as PAN, PKB, PBB, the public judge them as an Islamic party, because the cadres were not a few who have the educational background or Islamic organizations. While other religious parties were represented only by the Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS) as "the dynamics of Christianity". The other 16 are nationalist or socialist; PNI Marhaenisme, Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat, Partai Merdeka, Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan, Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru, Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan, Partai Demokrat, Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia. Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, PDI-P, Partai Golongan Karya, Partai Patriot Pancasila, Partai Serikat Indonesia, Partai Persatuan Daerah, and Partai Pelopor.

Of the 23 political opponents, although the 2004 election was the first trial of the PKS after renewing itself —previously named PK. PKS was able to penetrate the top six of the 2004 elections by winning 8,325,020 votes or 7.34% of the total votes.³⁸ The result was more than the party's estimates referring to Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) and Proksimasi, which referred to PKS vote of only about 5.3% -6.3%.³⁹ Referring to the survey, seats obtained only about 12. However, with a vote of 7.34%, PKS was able to put 45 representatives in DPR.

³⁸ KPU, *Buku Data dan Infografik Pemilu Anggota DPR RI dan DPD RI 2014*, p. 29.

³⁹ Yusuf, *Isu Besar*, p. 28

That is, PKS was able to defeat 18 other parties. Meanwhile, the parties that are above the PKS are Golkar, PDI-Perjuangan, PKB, PPP, and Democrat Party.

In the top six positions, the nationalist and Islamic parties are the same 3 (PKB, PPP, PKS) : 3 (Golkar, PDI-Perjuangan, Democratic Party). Meanwhile, compared with other Islamic parties, PKS was in the third highest position after PKB and PPP which respectively are in the third and fourth positions. Here's the vote of the PKS with the party as a whole and specific to the Islamic party:

Table I
The 2004 Election Outcome

Rank	Parties
1.	Partai Golkar
2.	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan
3.	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
4.	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
5.	Partai Demokrat
6.	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
7.	Partai Amanat Nasional
8.	Partai Bulan Bintang
9.	Partai Bintang Reformasi
10.	Partai Damai Sejahtera
11.	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa
12.	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia
13.	Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan
14.	Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan
15.	Partai Patriot Pancasila
16.	Partai Nasionalis Indonesia
17.	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia
18.	Partai Pelopor
19.	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia
20.	Partai Merdeka
21.	Partai Sarikat Indonesia
22.	Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru
23.	Partai Persatuan Daerah
24.	Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat

This position of the PKS in the 2004 elections, although not in the top three, gave rise to a satisfaction of the cadres. PKS management referred to the position as "spectacular outcome"⁴⁰. Therefore, the acquisition of nearly 7.5 percent of the vote is a fivefold increase from the previous election, which is 1.5 percent, when named PK. Even in DKI Jakarta, the region that became "national political indicator", PKS managed to become the winner with 21.53 percent vote.⁴¹ Compared to other Islamic parties, PKS was able to control 9 regions; North Sumatra, Lampung, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Banten, South Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku. The worst position of PKS was obtained in Central Kalimantan, which is in the sixth position of Islamic parties. As for seat acquisition, although the overall number of PKS was lower than PKB, the

⁴⁰ PKS, *Ringkasan Platform dan Isu-isu Nasional PKS*, p. 12.

⁴¹ KPU, *Pemilihan Umum 2004*, p. 137.

distribution of PKS seats was more evenly distributed. In detail; PKB has no seats in 22 provinces, PPP has only 9 vacant provinces, PKS was 14, PAN smallest, has no seats in 8 provinces, PBB and PBR same as PKB, that was 22 no seats, and PPNUI have no seat at all.

The acquisition of the chair shows the basis of each party. PKB though uneven, but it was board boosted the vote in East Java. PKB was able to control 6,297,366 votes in the province. Compared to Islamic parties, even other parties, despite the PDI Perjuangan, no one can achieve a vote of up to 6 million. That trend persists to the next elections. However, it also shows the weakness of PKB that was unable to form comprehensive cadres. In sum, the vacuum is the same as PBB and PBR, two new parties that do not have a base as much as PKB. Meanwhile, a fairly comprehensive PPP vote was a 'fair', because it was an old party and has created its own image in society, that it was the Islamic party of all people so that its voters are not polarized by NU, Muhammadiyah or the islamic activists. Moreover, this election was also the first election after the Reformation, the image of PPP as an Islamic party still quite high. For PAN, ideologically though it tends to the right, it is not like PKB and PKS, it was more likely to the middle stream, so the voters were more varied. So that way, no seats in 8 provinces was a common thing. While PKS, which was polarized ideologically very clearly the right party, like PPP —The difference was PKS is the new party— the vacancy of the provincial seat was only 14 or more than half of the whole province, it was a "spectacular" result. PKS also mentioned the acquisition as a success. PKS claimed the success as a result of the implementation of the slogan "Bersih dan Peduli".

In the 2009 election, the position of PKS increased into the top four under Partai Demokrat, Golkar, and PDI Perjuangan. That position brought PKS as an Islamic party that earns the most votes. Behind PKS lined up in the sequence of Islamic parties; PAN, PPP, PKB, PBB, then jumped one position, PBB, and down to PKNU, PBR, and the furthest PNUI. However, of the 8 Islamic parties, only four (PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB) can reach the threshold and gain seats in DPR. It means that the other four parties, PBB, PKNU, PBR, PNUI have been defeated.

Table II
The Result of 2009 Election

Rank	Parties
1.	Partai Demokrat
2.	Partai Golkar
3.	PDI Perjuangan
4.	PKS
5.	PAN
6.	PPP
7.	PKB
8.	Partai Gerindra
9.	Partai Hanura
10.	PBB
11.	PDS
12.	PKNU
13.	PKPB

14.	PBR
15.	PPRN
16.	PKPI
17.	PDP
18.	Barnas
19.	PPPI
20.	PDK
21.	Partai Nusantara
22.	PPD
23.	Partai Patriot
24.	PNBK
25.	Kedaulatan
26.	PMB
27.	PPI
28.	Pakar Pangan
29.	Partai Pelopor
30.	PKDI
31.	PIS
32.	PNI Marhaenisme
33.	Partai Buruh
34.	PPIB
35.	PPNUI
36.	PSI
37.	PPDI
38.	Partai Merdeka

Table III
The Islamic Parties Results in 2009 Election

Rank	Islamic Parties
4	PKS
5	PAN
6	PPP
7	PKB
10	PBB
12	PKNU
14	PBR
35	PPNUI

The position of the PKS in the top four also shows the hegemony of PKS from other Islamic parties. In 13 provinces, PKS was in a leading position compared to other Islamic party votes. Even in Kepulauan Riau, PKS was the only Islamic party that receives the appropriate sound threshold. PKS was unable to control Muslim voters in Central Java, East Java, and DI Yogyakarta. PKB and PAN were strong matches that are difficult to shift because they have a solid cultural mass base. For the trend of unoccupied provincial seats, the tendency of the Islamic party was almost the same as the 2004 election. One party that has fallen far was PPP. In the 2004 elections, almost every province of PPP always

had elected representatives. However, in the 2009 elections, there were 16 provinces that did not have PPP representatives. PKB also declined to 24 empty provincial seats, they still rely on cultural bases. PAN remains the fewest empty provincial seats, nine. PKS was the only Islamist party whose number of provincial vacant seats compared to the previous election increased from 14 to 11. The 'clean' image reinforced PKS declaration as an open party in 2008 to be one of the strongest factors for the rise of PKS positions, since basically, the declaration the open party is based on the pragmatism of PKS to gain votes.

In a position, the Islamic party that was able to stick to PKS was PAN. PAN position rose, from the seventh position in 2004, it was in fifth position in the 2009 election. The movement of the two parties to the center became one of the rising factors. Meanwhile, PPP that retained the image of the Islamic ummah party was eliminated, it also experienced on PKNU and PPNUI. Specification of the intended mass will gain a sound, it narrows the sound until the defeated. Whereas on the other hand, nationalist parties, such as PDI Perjuangan already have the right stream of Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (Bamusi) declared in 2007 to accommodate Islam.

In the 2014 election, the Islamic party was decreasing. From 8 parties in the 2009 elections to 5 parties in the 2014 election. The general result, PKS fall into seventh, under PDI Perjuangan, Golkar, Gerindra, Partai Demokrat, PKB, and PAN. Under PKS; Nasdem, PPP, Hanura, PBB, and PKPI. The seventh was the result of the PKS defeat in every province in Indonesia. PKS was only able to occupy the first position compared to other Islamic parties in three provinces. While the other was divided, the second position in 11 provinces, the third position in 13 provinces, the fourth position in 6 provinces. The result when specified from the number of empty provincial seats, the number of seats of PKS, as well as other Islamic parties, except PKB, increases. In the 2014 election, PKS has 17 vacant seats (2009 elections: 12 empty seats). The number of empty PKS seat provinces is the same as the number of empty seats of PKB (the 2009 election: 24 vacant seats), PAN remains the fewest, ie 10 empty seat provinces (2009 election: 9 vacant seats), PPP increasingly terporosok, from 16 empty seat provinces in the 2009 elections to 18 vacant seats in the 2014 election. Meanwhile, the UN is only a cheerleader, because both in each province have no representation.

Here are some table of comparison of PKS in three election (2004, 2009, and 2014):

Table IV
Position of PKS on Three Elections

Years	PKS Rank
2004	6
2009	4
2014	7

Table V
Position of PKS with Islamic Straits Party on Three Elections

Years	Islamic Parties	PKS Rank Among the Islamic Parties
2004	PKB, PPP, PKS, PAN, PBB, PBR, PPNUI	3
2009	PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB, PKNU, PBR, PPNUI	1
2014	PKB, PAN, PKS, PPP, PBB	3

Table VI
The Seats of PKS in Every Pvinces (2004, 2009, 2014 Election)

Province	2004	2009	2014
NAD	2	2	1
Sumut	2	3	3
Sumbar	2	2	2
Riau	1	1	1
Jambi	1	-	-
Sumsel	1	2	2
Bengkulu	-	1	-
Lampung	2	2	-
Babel	-	-	2
Kepri	-	1	-
DKI Jakarta	5	4	4
Jabar	13	12	11
Jateng	3	6	4
DIY	1	1	1
Jatim	2	6	2
Banten	3	3	2
Bali	-	-	-
NTB	1	1	1
NTT	-	-	-
Kalbar	-	1	-
Kalteng	-	-	-
Kalsel	1	2	1
Kaltim	-	1	1
Sulut	-	-	-
Sulteng	-	1	-
Sulsel	2	3	2
Sultra	-	1	-
Gorontalo	-	-	-
Maluku	1	-	-
Maluku Utara	1	-	-
Papua	-	-	1
Irian Jaya Barat	-	-	-

The Coalition or Opposition of PKS In The Parliament (DPR)

Party arrangements in parliament describe the attitude and ideology of a party. In 1999, there were 9 factions within the parliament, among others, the faction of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (14 members), Golongan Karya (11 members), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (4 members), Kebangkitan Bangsa (9 members), Reformasi (8 members), TNI/Polri (8 members), Partai Bulan Bintang (1 member), Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia (1 member), and Perserikatan Daulathul Ummah (1 member).⁴² To form a party faction, the party must be the sufficiently electoral threshold. If not, the party was 'coerced' in coalition with the power of other parties. The acquisition of PK seats at that time was not sufficient, so that 'forced' coalition with PAN led by Amien Rais.

Hidayat Nur Wahid gave an explanation of the participation of PK joining PAN was to be the opposition to Golkar Faction that was formed. At the same time, PK was actually invited to join parties that were clearly Islamic, such as PNU, PKU, Masyumi, and others to the Daulat Ummah (FPDU) Faction. However, the faction did not symbolize the hope for the existing reform of the Golkar Faction as a symbol of the New Order.

"But there is one thing that becomes a practical reason of PK. At that time the parties have registered themselves as factions in the Assembly. Golkar enlisted as a fraction in the assembly by the name of the Golkar Reform Faction. We thought then that if this is allowed, then the name and history of reform will be crushed and tick the swimmer. So how we against them? Yes by joining with PAN, because Amien Rais was known as the locomotive of reformation. That is also the reason we propose the name of the Reform Faction, not 'Fraksi Amanat Keadilan'".⁴³

In addition, there were two other reasons expressed by Hidayat Nur Wahid. First, almost the same as the first reason, the resistance of symbols against the Fraction of TNI / Polri (ABRI). With the merger of PK against the Reform Faction, ABRI faction was outnumbered. Whereas before PK merged with PAN in the Reform Faction, the number of ABRI Faction was one of the biggest strengths of the parliamentary fraction. Secondly, PK avoided the position of chairman of the FPDU. PK does not want to be busy with administrative matters. Therefore, the merger with PAN, which would not be elected to hold the faction chair, PK learned more politics.

From that explanation, PK's interests can be seen. In attitude, PK wanted to distance itself from the symbols of the New Order, such as Golkar Faction and ABRI Faction. Later, his election to join the PAN, not a party that clearly the Islamic party is another PK interest to accelerate politics on the national stage. The well-known figure of Amien Rais for his success in reform has greatly influenced PK's political pragmatism. This in the later stages has an impact on the presidency of the presidential candidate with "poros tengah" which will be explained in other.

Then in 2004, the party coalition was segmented on a national coalition and a popular coalition. The national coalition consisted of Golkar, PDI Perjuangan, Partai Bintang Reformasi, and Partai Damai Sejahtera plus PKB who "abandoned" the other factions. While the popular coalition consisted of the

⁴² *Panduan Parlemen Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Api, 2001), p. 497-500.

⁴³ Damanik, *Fenomena Partai*, p. 84.

PPP, Partai Demokrat, PAN, PKS, and Bintang Pelopor Demokrasi. The familiar national coalition was also known as the pro-Yudhono (government) coalition.

Although in the 2004 elections, the president came from Partai Demokrat that was in a “kerakyatan” coalition, but the commissions in the House were more controlled by a coalition of “kebangsaan”. There were 10 commissions headed by factions in the “kebangsaan” coalition. Golkar won five seats for the chairman of the commission and seven as vice-presidents. PDI Perjuangan won four seats of commission chairman and nine vice-chairmen. PKB has one chair and nine vice-presidents. In the meantime, PBR and PDS obtained one vice chairman respectively. Two members of PAN faction who attended as individuals in the session were given with two seats of vice chairman, Alvin Lie (Commission VII) and Sujud Surojudin (Commission IV).⁴⁴ The control of DPR by the “kebangsaan” coalition made the factions in the “kerakyatan” coalition only deposited the names of each commission to become its members.

In the period 2004-2009, people were more familiar with the dynamics in parliament as a form of dualism. Because, since the election of the Chairman of the Parliament (DPR), the election of MPR, the discussion of The Rules, and other, feuds between the two coalitions is very visible. Tensions between the two coalitions had melted on the discussion of commission leaders and board fittings (AKD). Farhan Hamid, a spokesman for the ruling coalition, even said it would stop the difference, however, in the plenary both heated up again.⁴⁵ When Jusuf Kalla was elected Golkar Chairman to replace Akbar Tandjung, the coalition of “kebangsaan” was rather fragile, because at that time Jusuf Kalla became Vice President Susilo Bambang Yudhono who came from the Partai Demokrat (“kerakyatan” coalition).

The gap was increasingly in the period 2009-2014. Coalitions in the parliament were more pro-government, and PKS entered the coalition with 57 seats, while others; Democratic Party (148 seats), Golkar (107 seats), PAN (46 seats), PPP (37 seats), and PKB (28 seats). While the only opposition coalition left by PDI Perjuangan, Gerindra, and Hanura. The majority vote in parliament became an important capital for the stability of the government. However, the coalition was in fact also fragile to maintain the stability of the government. The implementation of Century Question Rights was proof of the great coalition's looseness. PKS as a pro-government coalition faction was also involved in the establishment of the Special Committee (Pansus) on Century Bank Rights. Even in the committee, there were two members of PKS, and also consists of opposition coalitions, such as PDI Perjuangan and Hanura. In this period the committee was also known as the committee 9; Mukhamad Misbakhun and Andi Rahmat (PKS), Maruarar Sirait (PDI Perjuangan), Ahmad Muzani (Gerindra), Lili Wahid (PKB), Akbar Faisal (Hanura), Chandra Tirta Wijaya (PAN), Kurdi Mukhtar (PPP), and Bambang Soesetyo (Golkar).

Coalition trends, pro-opposition in the 2014 election were also increasingly visible, with the emergence of a Merah Putih Coalition (KMP) and Indonesia Hebat Coalition (KIH). KMP was known as the government's

⁴⁴ “Koalisi Kebangsaan Kuasai Semua Komisi di DPR” in <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/50087/koalisi-kebangsaan-kuasai-semua-komisi-di-dpr>, 29th of October 2004.

⁴⁵ “Bukan Pertama Kali, Ini Kisah Dualisme DPR Tahun 2004” in <http://www.satuharapan.com/read-detail/read/bukan-pertama-kali-ini-kisah-dualisme-dpr-tahun-2004>, 30th of October 2014.

opposition and KIH was known as pro-government. PKS entered into the KMP coalition with Gerindra, PAN, PPP, PBB and Golkar. Meanwhile, KIH consisted of PDI Perjuangan, PKB, NasDem, Hanura, and PKP Indonesia. At the top of the DPR, KMP got more space. Therefore there was the generalization in society, government and parliament will always be debatable. However, in its history, the coalition was also fragile, as Golkar and PAN joined KIH. Despite the stubbornness, unlike previous period coalitions that were also critical, PKS presents a loyal party image in KMP. According to Chairman of DPS PKS Public Relations, Mardani Ali Sera, vision and mission as well as the function of PKS policy in line with KMP.

According to the development of the coalition political map, PKS never joins the coalition where PDI Perjuangan is a part of it. It showed, PKS stream to keep distance with PDI Perjuangan. Only in the case of Century Bank, PKS joined a team of PDI Perjuangan committee. Despite joining the government coalition at the time, this attitude could be seen as an effort of PKS to display the PKS's stern image for corruption-free.

In addition to the stream towards PDI Perjuangan, the stream of PKS to Golkar was also interesting. In the coalition, PKS always keeps a distance with PDI Perjuangan, on the contrary, although in the early of reform, PKS (formerly PK) keeps a distance from Golkar, in the next period, PKS has joined in the same coalition with Golkar. It shows that the sign of Hidayat Nur Wahid at the beginning of reform to join the reform faction to against Golkar is not the main reason. The interest of PK joining the reform faction to accelerate politics was the main reason. Therefore, PKS coalition stream in parliament is more based on the interests. Until the 2014 election, PKS ideology line is only different with PDI Perjuangan. However, if in the future the political reality of joining the PDI Perjuangan is more beneficial, it is not impossible that the PKS will be in one coalition with PDI Perjuangan.

The Coalition and Opposition of PKS in the Governments

In the presidential election at the beginning of the reformation, a new power called the "poros tengah". The power was able to defeat the great political forces of PDI Perjuangan. The presence of poros tengah concretely elicited Abdurrahman's figure as president and Amien Rais as a Head of MPR. This poros tengah was managed by PK, PAN, PPP, and PBB. PK's political acceleration on poros tengah was interesting to observe, as it related to the party's stream towards the government. The interesting existence can be traced from the note given PK to poros tengah.

"Each party supporting Poros Tengah has a hidden agenda and political maneuvers and there is no formal agreement that can be used as a common reference."⁴⁶

As a party filled with new political figures that emerged after 1996,⁴⁷ PK's participation in Poros Tengah was a political acceleration effort such as its incorporation into the Reform Fraction. Although the reason that PK joined the Poros Tengah was for *wihdatul ummah* (the unity of the ummah), but in the reality, PK was the most "vocal" party in criticizing Abdurrahman.

⁴⁶ Damanik, *Fenomena Partai*, p. 290.

⁴⁷ *Panduan Parlemen*, p. 1257.

There are two things that can be interpreted from PK participation in Poros Tengah. First, *wihdatul ummah* can be interpreted as a form of resistance to PDI Perjuangan which was then carrying Megawati as a presidential candidate. This shows a firm stance between PKS and PDI Perjuangan ideology. PK's power was not able to compete with PDI Perjuangan, so the only way was to join the Poros Tengah. Second, the political acceleration PK. At that time, the presence of Poros Tengah was a surprise in the Indonesian political phenomenon. Therefore, its presence was highly highlighted by the public. The existence of parties that join the axis was certainly affected. Therefore, PK's participation in Poros Tengah could also be interpreted by the party's pragmatism. The statement "each Poros Tengah party has a hidden agenda" is a reflection of PK's involvement in Poros Tengah.

As a bargaining position, PK was committed not to participate in the government cabinet that will be formed, in this case, Gus Dur period. This means that PK avoids sharing seats in the cabinet. Another note, PK only supported the government in favor of Islamic *da'wah*. This was the recommendation of PK Leadership Congress in 1999. The pragmatism of PK participation in Poros Tengah and its bargaining became one of PK's political acceleration. Evidently, in Gus Dur's government, no PK cadres entered the cabinet. With this maneuver, PK tried to create an image; although we participated in carrying Abdurrahman as president, our party remained an idealist not to accept the division of ministers (*bagi-bagi kursi*).

Incidents occurred only in the early days of government when Gus Dur gave 'lead services' to the Poros Tengah parties, including PK. President of PK Nur Mahmudi at that time was appointed Minister of Forestry and Plantation. The society judged it as a PK action in self-licking. However, the view was immediately ignored, when Nur Mahmudi decided to withdraw from PK President and quitted PK. The action was initiated by the party and made PK as a party not tied to the government, making it very critical of Gus Dur. It was PK's political acceleration on the national stage. Some of the major issues criticized by PK were Gus Dur's policy of opening diplomacy with Israel and the withdrawal of MPRS TAP no. XXV / 1996. Hidayat Nur Wahid also declared Gus Dur to "end his own" which was interpreted by the public as an attitude to reverse Gus Dur. Concretely, PK mobilized the masses demanding that Wahid quitted the presidency. At this stage, PK was quite successful in accelerating politics.

After Abdurrahman withdrew from the president, his vice, Megawati immediately rose to become President. Consideration was certainly thought PK. Therefore, PK's stance has been very unequivocal not supporting Megawati as president as she showed in participation to Poros Tengah clogging Megawati which carried PDI Perjuangan. Therefore, PK's position was the government's opposition party at the time. Concretely, PK rejected the ministerial position offered by Megawati. The issue circulated by PK to the public for the government was Megawati's inconsistency in creating the reform.

Unlike the Megawati period, in Susilo Bambang Yudhono (SBY) period, PKS voted in coalition with the government. Coalition trends that clearly separated parties between pro and opposition emerged during this period. Pro-government parties joined "kerakyatan" coalition (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Partai Demokrat, Partai Amanat Nasional, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, and Fraksi Bintang Pelopor Demokrasi). Meanwhile, government

opposition parties joined the “kebangsaan” coalition (Golkar, PDI Perjuangan, Partai Bintang Reformasi, Partai Damai Sejahtera, and PKB).

In the first election, PKS actually chose Amien Rais, but in the second election, PKS attitude turned support SBY. The change of attitude was based on the political contract agreed upon by both. There were five articles that became the agreement of PKS, consistent in good governance, maintaining the sovereignty of Indonesia in the international world, consistently continuing democratization and reformation, improving the moral quality of the nation by upholding human rights, and supporting the Palestinian struggle and not open diplomatic relations with Israel.⁴⁸ Although it appears idealistic, in political reality, this change of attitude is an acceleration of PKS on the national political stage.

In Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono accommodated three cadres proposed by PKS; Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Public Housing, and Minister of Youth and Sports. Although already accommodated, but PKS was not satisfied because SBY in the early days to served four ministers.⁴⁹ This also made PKS, despite the coalition of the government, also gave criticism of SBY's performance.

In Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu II, PKS remains in a pro-government coalition with Partai Demokrat, Golkar, PAN, PPP, and PKB. The opposition left only PDI Perjuangan, Gerindra, and Hanura. In this cabinet, SBY accommodated four PKS cadres to serve as ministers; Minister of Agriculture (Suswono), Minister of Social Affairs (Salim Assegaf Aljufrie), Minister of Communication and Informatics (Tifatul Sembiring), and Minister of Research and Technology (Suharna Surapranata).⁵⁰

Nevertheless, PKS still sounds discordant by criticizing the hard case of Century Bank which at that time became an issue that attacked SBY. Even in PKS parliament involved in the questionnaire of Century Bank inquiry. PKS also did not approve the fuel price increase initiated by SBY. To create a firm line and clarification to the public, PKS made a rule that the cadres in the cabinet must be separated from the party structure. Mardani stated that the cabinet and parliament are different things. Parliament is in charge of serving the state, and the parliament serves to oversee. Therefore, it was fair to say that on the one hand, PKS cadres are comfortable in the government cabinet,⁵¹ but on the one hand are critical to the government.

In Jokowi's government, PKS joined Merah Putih coalition (KMP) as the government's opposition vis a vis with Indonesia Hebat coalition (KIH) as pro-government. With Gerindra Party, PPP, PBB, PKS is critical of the government. Unlike previous maneuvers, the attitude of PKS is in opposition less pragmatic as it was done before. Because, after PAN and Golkar declared their move to KMP, the pro-government vote was bigger in the public. Therefore, the government

⁴⁸ LIPI, *Quo Vadis Politik Indonesia?* p. 42.

⁴⁹ “PKS Tagih Jatah 4 Menteri di Kabinet” in <https://news.detik.com/berita/481822/pks-tagih-jatah-4-menteri-di-kabinet>, 19th of November 2005.

⁵⁰ “Inilah 34 Menteri Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu II dan Catatannya” in <https://nusantaranews.com/2009/10/21/inilah-menteri-kabinet-indonesia-bersatu-ii-catatannya/>, 21th of October 2009.

⁵¹ “4 Menteri dari PKS Mengaku Nyaman di Kabinet SBY” in <https://news.detik.com/berita/1744722/4-menteri-dari-pks-mengaku-nyaman-di-kabinet-sby>, 15th of October 2011.

coalition is larger and if it is read in the current context, the government coalition is more loyal than the previous government. In the cabinet, PKS also can not get the position in ministry. Unlike in Gus Dur's government, PKS is also unable to find great momentum for political acceleration. Its presence as an opposition party is only a difficult counterweight to socio-political change. Moreover, when Fahri Hamzah was dismissed, PKS did not have a significant position in determining the policy. For that, the prospect of the future, there could be a new political style of PKS, such as a coalition with PDI Perjuangan that was never done before. The phenomenon began to appear when the issue of a nationalist-religious coalition for the Election of Governor of West Java in 2018.

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